The purpose of this article is to illustrate the potential interest of the control theory framework for cryptographic applications. It is shown that under the properties of left invertibility and flatness, dynamical systems are structurally equivalent to some specific cryptographic primitives called self-synchronising stream ciphers. After having motivated the interest of considering hybrid systems for such ciphers, the development is particularised for the special class of switched linear systems. We also show that identifiability is a necessary condition for security, and we describe an identification procedure as a possible attack and assess its complexity.
Introduction
Hybrid systems have inspired a great deal of research from both control theory and theoretical computer science (HSCC 2008) . They provide a strong theoretical foundation which combines discrete-event and continuous-time systems in a manner that can capture software logic and physical dynamics in a unified modelling framework. The most well-known area of the applicability of hybrid systems is naturally modelling, analysis and control design of embedded systems. From a theoretical point of view, stability, identifiability, controller or observer design are challenging problems widely studied in the literature (Bemporad, Ferrari-trecate, and Morari 2000; Balluchi, Benvenuti, Benedetto, and SangiovanniVincentelli 2002; Babaali, and Egerstedt 2004; Juloski et al. 2005; Shorten, Wirth, Mason, Wulff, and King 2007) .
In this article, left invertibility, flatness and identifiability of discrete-time switched linear systems are investigated. The hybrid aspect is really taken into account insofar as the minimum 'dwell-time' assumption is relaxed or in other words, since the switching rule is not restricted to the case when the modes are active during a sufficient large time. The conditions characterising left invertibility (Sain and Massey 1969) and flatness (Levine and Nguyen 2003) of linear systems are no longer valid.
Next, it is shown that under the properties of left invertibility and flatness, dynamical systems are structurally equivalent to some specific cryptographic primitives called self-synchronising stream ciphers. The consideration of hybrid systems is motivated by the fact that introducing heterogeneity in the ciphers sounds relevant. Indeed, in order to improve the security of a cipher, a general idea has been proposed and motivated by Shamir (see Klimov and Shamir (2004) as a pioneering work). Shamir suggests to mix algebraic domains and thereby to use combinations of boolean and arithmetic operations. And yet, switched systems are intrinsically heterogeneous in this sense since they involve several algebraic models which are switched in time according to some logical rules (Liberzon 2003) . The development is particularised here for switched linear systems. We further show that identifiability is a necessary condition for security, and we describe an identification procedure as a possible attack and assess its complexity.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents algebraic conditions under which the switched linear discrete-time systems are left invertible and flat. A sequential left inversion procedure is provided. Next, identifiability and identification are addressed. In Section 3, a structural comparison between such dynamical systems and the special encryption schemes called self-synchronising stream ciphers are brought out and illustrated through a simple numerical example. Further issues to be investigated in the perspective of designing full-fledged cryptographic primitives are sketched.
Left invertibility, flatness and identification of switched linear systems
In this section, results on left invertibility, flatness and identification of switched linear systems are expressed in a form suitable to discuss their impact in secure communication applications. More general treatments can be found in Millerioux and Daafouz (2009) for left invertibility and flatness properties and in Vidal, Ma, and Sastry (2003) for identification. Before proceeding further, let us introduce some useful notation. Consider the switched linear dynamical system:
where x k 2 R n , u k 2 R and y k 2 R. All the matrices, namely
At a given time k, the index j corresponds to the mode of the system and results from a switching function :
Let U be the space of input sequences over [0, 1) and Y the corresponding output space. At time k, for each initial state x k 2 R n , when the system (1) is driven by the input sequence fug 
Left invertibility and left inversion
Before addressing the left invertibility property, the relative degree of a switched linear system must be defined. We first recall a general definition.
Definition 2.1: The relative degree of a dynamical system with respect to its input u k is the required number r of iterations of its output y k so as y kþr depends explicitly on u k .
Remark 1: Hereafter, we only consider the case when the relative degree r is constant.
We are checking for an algebraic interpretation of the relative degree for (1) in terms of its state space description matrices. To this end, we must write down the expression of y kþi by iterating (1) and with the transition matrix defined as:
1 n is the identity matrix of dimension n. According to Definition 2.1, the relative degree r of (1) is
6 ¼ 0 for all k . the least integer r 5 1 such that for all k
Let us notice that the product of matrices involved in
ðkÞ is the generalisation of the well-known discretetime Markov parameters CA s B for a linear system described by the 4-uple (A, B, C, D) of state space matrices.
When (1) has a relative degree r, its output reads at time k þ r:
Definition 2.2: The system (1) is left invertible if there exists a non-negative integer R51 such that, for any two input sequences fug kþR k , fu 0 g kþR k 2 U, the following implication applies:
In other words, (1) is left invertible if the input u k can be uniquely determined from an output sequence of finite length for any known initial condition and switching rule. It turns out that if (1) has a finite relative degree r, it is also left invertible with R ¼ r. Indeed, if (1) has a finite relative degree r, (5) holds and the input u k can be deduced in a unique way. It reads:
ðkÞ
The existence of the inverse of T r,0 ðkÞ is guaranteed since, by definition (Equation (3)), it is always different from zero. Actually, let us notice that for (1), according to (7), only the last sample y kþR of the sequence fyðx k , , uÞg kþR k is required for recovering u k . We are now concerned with a recursive left inversion of (1) achieving the recovery of u k from y k without any knowledge of x k . Let us define the inverse transition matrix as 
Proposition 2.3: Assume that (1) is left invertible and has a relative degree r. The following dynamical system is a stable r-delayed inverter for (1) whenever the system kþ1 ¼ P r ðkÞ k is uniformly asymptotically stable:
Proof: On the one hand, substituting (5) into (9) yieldŝ
Taking into account (8) and noticing that ðT
On the other hand, from the expression (7) of u k and the expression ofû kþr in (9), we get that
From (12) we can infer thatû kþr converges towards u k as long asx kþr converges towards x k , that is, provided that the system kþ1 ¼ P r ðkÞ k with k ¼ k is uniformly asymptotically stable. oe
Flatness
We first recall a general definition of flat output (for details about flatness, the reader can refer to Fliess, Levine, Martin, and Rauchon (1995) or the book by Sira-Ramirez and Agrawal (2004)).
Definition 2.4:
A flat output of a dynamical system is an output variable y k such that all system variables can be expressed as a function of y k and a finite number of its forward/backward iterates. In particular, there exist two functions F , G and integers t 1 5t 2 , t 0
such that
We derive an algebraic interpretation of flat outputs for (1).
Proposition 2.5: The output y k of (1), assumed to be left invertible and to have relative degree r, is a flat output if there exists a positive integer 05K51 such that for all k ! 0
where 0 stands for the null matrix.
Proof: The proof is based on the inverse system. If (1) is left invertible and has a relative degree r, (9) exists. Iterating (9) l À 1 times yieldŝ 
If (14) is fulfilled, (15) turns intô revealing thatx kþrþK is independent ofx kþr . In particular, (16) holds forx k 0 þr ¼ x k 0 for all k 0 ! 0, that is for k 0 ¼ 0 with k 0 ! 0. By virtue of (11), we infer that k ¼ 0 for all k ! k 0 and thusx kþrþK ¼ x kþK for all k ! 0. Therefore, after performing the change of variable k ! k À K, we obtain an explicit form for F involved in (13). 
On the other hand, substituting (17) into (7) yields an explicit form for G involved in (13) and then, we infer that y k is a flat output according to Definition 2.4. h
Identification
Let be a parameter vector consisting of a subset of entries of (A j ) 1 j J , (B j ) 1 j J , (C j ) 1 j J and (D j ) 1 j J in the state space model (1). Having in mind the cryptographic context which will be further considered, we present an identification procedure of based on the input/output model of (1). When the switched system (1) is flat, its input/ output model can be obtained in a systematic and convenient way. Indeed, if (1) is flat with flat output y k , the state vector x k obeys (17). Substituting the expression (17) of x k into (5) yields the input/output relation: 
. The number N of all possible mode sequences is finite since the number J of modes of (1) is. These mode sequences will be, respectively, denoted for short 1 , . . . , N in the sequel. Thus, for t ¼ 1, . . . , N, the input/output relation (18) can be rewritten as
where c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s ( j ¼ 0, . . . , K À 1) are coefficients depending, in different ways according to the sequence t , on the entries of the matrices (
Based on (19), two identification procedures can be distinguished according to the assumption on the accessibility of t .
First identification procedure: Let us first assume that t is accessible. Since for each t , the parameters c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s appear in a linear fashion in the input/ output relation (19), they are obviously identifiable and the identification is easy. Indeed, for a given mode sequence t , under the usual persistently exciting (PE) conditions, the identification can always be performed by iterating the relation (19) until a set of linear independent equations is obtained and can be solved. The solution is unique for each t and gives c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s.
Second identification procedure: Conversely, let us assume that t is not accessible. The previous procedure no longer holds. Thus the identification procedure for recovering c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s must be substituted by another one. It turns out that it can be inspired from the method proposed in Vidal et al. (2003) for switched ARX systems. This method is summed up and adapted to our context. Each input/output relation (19) can be rewritten for
z k is the regressor vector while b t is the parameter vector corresponding to the mode sequence t . We can thereby define N hyperplanes S t ,
The key idea rests on the fact that the so-called Hybrid Decoupling Constraint equation is fulfilled regardless of the switching sequences:
M N is a Veronese map of degree N, the components of k corresponding to all the M N monomials (product of the components of z k ) sorted in the degree-lexicographic order. The quantity M N is given by
For the identification of the b t 's in (20), it is first needed to compute the coefficients h N of (21). To this end, let L N denote an embedded data matrix involving
The following relation applies:
If the mapped regressor vectors N (z k i ) are sufficiently exciting (PE conditions), the existence of an integer N 0 such that the
is guaranteed. The lower bound of N 0 is M N À 1. If (24) is fulfilled, the coefficient h N can be retrieved by
Ker stands for the null space. If w t is a point lying on the tth hyperplane S t , we can obtain, for t ¼ 1, . . . , N, the b t 's from the knowledge of h N by performing:
where e stands for the vector [1 0 Á Á Á 0] 2 R Kþ2 and Dp N (w t ) stands for the derivative Dp N (z k ) of p N (z k ) with z k ¼ w t . Dp N (z k ) reads
Remark 2: An algebraic solution to determine the N distinct points w t that lie on the N hyperplanes S t can be found in Vidal et al. (2003) .
The unicity of the solution of an identification procedure is directly related to the notion of parametric identifiability (No˜mm and Moog 2004; Anstett, Bloch, Mille´rioux, and Denis-Vidal, 2008) . Indeed, let us recall that a parameter of a discrete-time dynamical system is identifiable if it can be rewritten as a unique function of the input, the output and their iterates. For (1), it turns out that the aforementioned identification procedures provide c( t ) and the (19) in a unique way and that they depend on the input, the output and their iterates. Indeed, observe that b t (and so c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s ( j ¼ 0, . . . , K À 1, t ¼ 1, . . . , N )) that are inferred from (26) which involves p N depends in turn on h N through (21). Finally, regarding (25), h N depends on the input, the output and their iterates of (1). On the other hand, the rank condition (24) and the normalisation of b t in (26) guarantee unicity. Thus, recalling that is a subset of entries of (A j ) 1 j J , (B j ) 1 j z , (C j ) 1 j J and (D j ) 1 j J of (1), the unicity of is guaranteed provided that can be deduced from c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s in a unique way.
Application to secure communication
The aim of this section is to show and to illustrate the potential interest, for cryptographic applications, of the control theory framework developed in Section 1.
Generalities on stream ciphers
A general stream cipher mechanism is illustrated in Figure 1 . We are given an alphabet A, that is, a finite set of basic elements named symbols. On the transmitter part, a plaintext (also called information or message) m 2 M (M is called the message space) consisting of a string of symbols m k 2 A is encrypted according to an encryption function e which depends on a so-called running key z k . Consequently, for stream ciphers, the encryption function can change for each symbol. The sequence {z k } is called the keystream. The resulting ciphertext c 2 C (C is called the ciphertext space), a string of symbols c k from an alphabet B usually (and assumed hereafter) identical to A, is conveyed through a public channel to the receiver. At the receiver side, the ciphertext c is decrypted according to a decryption function d which depends on the running keyẑ k . For a prescribed z k , the function e must be invertible. The running keys z k and z k are delivered by generators which are identical at the transmitter and receiver sides. They are, respectively, parameterised at the transmitter side by a secret key k e 2 K, (K being the key space) and parameterised at the receiver side by k d 2 K. For proper decryption, the equality k d ¼ k e must be fulfilled. In the sequel, the secret key will be denoted by k d ¼ k e ¼ . Stream ciphers are generally well appropriate and their use can even be compulsory when buffering is limited or when only one symbol can be processed at a time: the field of telecommunications often includes such constraints.
Next we detail the special class of stream ciphers called self-synchronising stream ciphers.
3.2 Self-synchronising stream ciphers Self-synchronising stream ciphers admit the following recursion, written with the usual notation encountered in the literature: Equation (28) 
Transmitter generator generator Figure 1 . General encryption mechanism.
protocols for recovering lost synchronisation. Second, the self-synchronising mechanism also enables the receiver to switch at any time into an ongoing enciphered transmission. Third, any modification of ciphertext symbols by an active eavesdropper causes incorrect decryption for a fixed number of next symbols. As a result, an SSSC prevents active eavesdroppers from undetectable tampering with the plaintext: message authenticity is possible. The equations of the decryption part obey:
with, according to the principle of symmetric ciphers explained above, the decryption function d obeying the rule:m
Since the generators function ss share, at the transmitter and receiver sides, the same quantities, namely the past ciphertexts, it is clear that the generators synchronise automatically after a finite transient time of length M, that isẑ k ¼ z k for k ! M. That explains the terminology self-synchronising stream ciphers.
Actually, (28) is a conceptual model, called canonical representation, that may correspond to numerous different architectures and may result from different design approaches (Maurer 1991; Daemen and Kitsos 2005) . We show in the next section, with a special treatment on switched linear systems, that under the properties of left invertibility and flatness, dynamical systems are structurally equivalent to selfsynchronising stream ciphers.
3.3
The role of left invertibility and flatness in the design of SSSC Proposition 3.1: If (1) has a finite relative degree r and y k is a flat output, then (1) is structurally equivalent to a self-synchronising stream cipher.
Proof : By virtue of (5) and (17), the system (1) can be rewritten in the following equivalent form: 
and the result follows from the identification of (31) with (28), the correspondences being:
Identification and security
An essential issue for the validation of ciphers is the cryptanalysis, that is, the study of attacks against cryptographic schemes in order to reveal their possible weakness. A fundamental assumption in cryptography, first stated by A. Kerkhoff in Delfs and Knebl (2002), is that any unauthorised person (called adversary or eavesdropper) knows all the details of the cipher, including the algorithm and its implementation, except the secret key. As a result, insofar as the parameters of (1) are expected to act as the secret key, the security is directly related to the complexity of retrieving the parameters .
It is usual to assume that the eavesdropper has the opportunity of controlling the input of the cipher, namely the plaintext, and analysing the corresponding ciphertext (the attack is called chosen plaintext attack). In our context, if the dynamical system (1) is considered as a cipher, that means that the pair (u k , y k ) is assumed to be known by the eavesdropper. The recovery of can only be based on the input/output model of (1).
Besides, it is worth emphasising that a cipher must face at least the most basic attack, i.e. the brute force attack. This attack consists in trying exhaustively every possible parameter value in the parameter space of the secret key (which is in practice a finite space). The quicker the brute force attack, the weaker the cipher. Consequently, the worst situation for the eavesdropper and the best for the security arises when, for known plaintexts and corresponding ciphertext sequences, only one solution in the parameters of the cipher exists. As explained in Section 1.4, the unicity is directly related to the notion of parametric identifiability. As a result, we conclude that the most relevant parameters of a system to act as the secret key are the ones which are identifiable. Such a result might appear as paradoxical at first glance because of a possible misunderstanding on the meaning of 'identifiable'. Actually, identifiability means unicity in the parameters. Such a paradox has been highlighted in Anstett, Mille´rioux, and Bloch (2006) .
Thus, according to the above discussion and Section 1.4, we infer the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2:
The secret key must be the set of entries of (A j ) 1 j J , (B j ) 1 j J , (C j ) 1 j J and (D j ) 1 j J of (1) which can be deduced from c( t ) and the a j ( t )'s in a unique way.
Actually, the security is related to the complexity of the underlying identification procedure. The recovery of the secret parameters can be performed through the identification procedures described in Section 2.4. Clearly, the identification procedure is much more complex when t is not accessible. Thus, the secret key must be determined so that the eavesdropper has no other choice than resorting to the second identification procedure. As a result, t must not be directly accessible and the following proposition must be thereby fulfilled.
Proposition 3.3:
The switching rule must depend on .
We can assess the security in terms of the complexity of the required algebraic computations to identify . The most important task in the second identification procedure is the computation of the coefficients h N through (25). In practice, the kernel (null space) is obtained through singular values decomposition (SVD) of which complexity is 
Illustrative example
We consider a switched linear system in the form (1) with (ii) The computation of (14) gives 0 with K ¼ 2 and reveals that y k is a flat output. From (i) and (ii), we can infer that, according to Proposition 3.1, the system is structurally equivalent to a self-synchronising stream cipher. The dimension L of is L ¼ 5. Let us check whether would be an admissible choice for the secret key in terms of identifiability.
The computation of (18) allows us to obtain an input/output relation in the form (19) 
From (33), we infer that can be recovered in a unique way from the knowledge of (a 0 ( t ), a 1 ( t ), c( t )) (t ¼ 1, . . . , 4) and then Proposition 2.2 is fulfilled. Consequently, could act as the secret key and must also be involved in the switching rule according 
Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed and illustrated the potential interest of the control theory framework for cryptographic applications. It has been shown that invertibility and flatness are two properties which allow a dynamical system to be structurally equivalent to a self-synchronising stream cipher. Identifiability is related to the notion of unicity in the parameters, a necessary required property of any ciphers when parameters act as the secret key. Involving hybrid systems is motivated by the relevance of introducing heterogeneity in the ciphers. In this article, switched linear systems have been investigated. Nevertheless, if a fully specified cipher is thought, the security aspect deserves a deeper investigation. Indeed, identification consists of a so-called algebraic attack in the context of cryptography. It could be expected that the linearity of the modes is a weakness and that nonlinearities should be introduced, while keeping heterogeneity through hybrid models and a similar control theory framework. Besides, other kinds of attacks should be considered, to mention a few, linear and differential cryptanalysis, distinguisher-based attacks and side channels attacks. Those kinds of issues are naturally out of the scope of the present article.
